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21 SEP 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Research

THROUGH: DD/I

SUBJECT: Scientific and Technical Intelligence - General

REFERENCE: AC/DCI Memo, dated 27 August 1962

PURPOSE

1. This memorandum contains OSI comments relative to cost and manpower estimates with respect to specific recommendations contained in Attachment B to USIB-D-34.4/3.

COMMENTS

2. The Office of Scientific Intelligence has no comments on recommendations a, g, i, and j.

3. Concerning recommendation b, the Office will support through the use of all available manpower the program for exploitation of Soviet Bloc scientific and technical literature. It does not anticipate the expenditure of funds or manpower above the current rate.

5. Concerning recommendation d, OSI does not anticipate the expenditure of funds or additional manpower for the acquisition and exploitation of Soviet Bloc material, although such material will be acquired as opportunities present themselves.

6. Concerning recommendation e, the Office will assist in the development and implementation of a long-range program for clandestine collection of scientific and technical information from the Sino-Soviet

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7. Concerning recommendation f, the Office of Scientific Intelligence has already expended considerable effort in making use of US research and development facilities, especially at Space Technology Laboratories for the analysis of ballistic missile telemetry and trajectories. As a further development of this program, a space vehicle assessment contract has just been initiated with the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Other such contracts are planned, because the timely and complete coverage of several other high priority areas requires specialized analysis and equipment, including automatic data processing based on US research and development data [REDACTED]. Such analysis cannot be done within OSI without major increase in Office personnel ceilings and additional physical facilities; therefore the Office plans to rely on specialized contracts. OSI proposes to expand this program to a

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[REDACTED]

OSI external research budget, and [REDACTED] additional professional positions in the Offensive Systems Division, the Defensive Systems Division, and the Space Division, primarily to cover rapidly expanding developments in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

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8. Concerning recommendation h, the Office of Scientific Intelligence will continue to support the development of new collection techniques and equipment and try to ensure adequate means for processing the information derived from such systems. The Office is prepared to provide full support to the ID/R, the Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC), and others, in the testing, evaluation and deployment of the equipment. OSI does not anticipate

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a major expenditure of funds, but personnel needs indicate an immediate increase of three positions based on the expanded responsibilities of the Defensive Systems Division to provide support to operational activities, notably those of the DD/R.

9. Concerning recommendation 1, improved collection processes and techniques together with an expanded external contract program utilizing the highly technical capabilities of qualified non-government laboratories and research and development organizations will greatly enhance the production of scientific and technical intelligence. Thus, without increased expenditure of funds or manpower except as specified above, OSI expects to broaden its support to IS research and development organizations such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Science Foundation, and the Office of Education and the Public Health Service of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

10. With respect to recommendation 4, it would be well to take note of the development of technical intelligence components outside of the intelligence divisions of the Air Force and the Army. While coordination with Foreign Technology Division of the Air Force Systems Command has been reasonably close because the most important part of this unit was a carry over from Air Technical Intelligence Command, the interposing of additional echelons between FTD and the rest of the Intelligence Community has had the inevitable effect of complicating coordination. In the case of the Army, the Foreign Science and Technical Center is under the Army Materiel Command and has been created from portions of the former tech intelligence units of the technical services plus some personnel from ACSI. Previously our contact with the tech intelligence agencies had been rather desultory and we must establish new lines for the most part to FSTC. Both of these Commands have as part of their missions the supplying of intelligence to the research and development organizations of their respective services. We cannot quarrel with this part of their missions and in fact hope that they are able to do a good job of it. But this trend toward removing tech intelligence components from the USIB agencies will increase the difficulties of avoiding duplication and coordinating activities in general, not to mention a substantial additional cost in terms of manpower and funds.

  
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Scientific Intelligence

Attachment: Graph

Distribution: 141 - Addressee; 2-OD/SI; 2 - DC/Staff; 2 Plans/P&E

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